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RAILROAD AND HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATIONI. Elements of Railroad Policy

Since prewar years, the major elements in Soviet railroad policy have been:

1) to reduce the demand on the Soviet railroad system. This was to result from

- a) Increasing the proportion of total Soviet traffic hauled on  
waterways and roads
- b) Reducing average length of haul, in large part through the  
policy of regional self-sufficiency
- c) Eliminating wasteful cross hauling.

2) to improve the efficiency of Soviet railroad operation. This was to result from

- a) Reducing turnaround time of freight cars, to be achieved by reducing  
time of loading and unloading, reducing average length of haul  
(as indicated above), and increasing train speed
- b) Increasing tonnage loading per car
- c) Increasing tonnage loading per train
- d) Increasing the daily run of locomotives.

3) to improve the facilities of the Soviet railroads. The main elements in this  
item are:

- a) Increasing the locomotive and rolling stock park

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- b) Construction of new lines
- c) Double tracking selected lines
- d) Laying heavier rail and making other track improvements on selected lines
- e) Installing improved types of signalling on selected lines.

## II. Postwar Changes in Railroad Policy

There is no evidence that there have been any major changes in Soviet railroad policy in the postwar period. It is possible that there may be a shift of emphasis. For example, the average length of haul of freight in 1952 was 720 km., although the 1950 plan called for an average haul of 690 kms. Thus, it appears that attempts to achieve regional self sufficiency have not permitted a significant reduction in this factor since 1946 when it was 743 kms. In view of the difficulty of achieving further reductions in this figure, it is likely that in the future this factor may be ignored.

## III. Organizations Concerned with Railroad and Highway Policies

### A. Railroad

The organizational breakdown of the Ministry of Transportation (also called Ministry of Railways) in the USSR is  which contains the most recent available compilation on this subject. The

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railroads were broken down regionally into administrative Okrugs; each Okrug included an average of about six railroad systems. A study of the administration of Soviet railroads is to be included in  project 43.3.5, "USSR Rail Operating Organization and Methods."

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The only major postwar change applying to the organizational structure for the railroads known at present is the abolition of Okrugs in 1951 (Gudok, 25 June 1952 mentions this in the obituary of the head of a railroad system.) The significance of this change is not clear, since the function of the Okrug was not understood. It is possible that the Okrugs interposed an additional amount of administrative work between the Ministry and the railroad systems, which was found undesirable and inefficient.

#### B. Highway Transport

The only known recent organizational changes affecting highway transport and automobile and truck production was the Soviet reorganization plan announced on 15 March 1953.\* Concerning automobile and truck production, the plan merged the "Ministry of the Automobile and Tractor Industries" with three other machine-building ministries to form the "Ministry of Machine-Building of the USSR." In

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the reorganization plan the Ministry of Automobile Transport was abolished and its functions were handed over to the USSR Ministry of Transportation. The latter merger is considered significant because heretofore, automobile transport had been on a Republic level. In bringing highway transport up to a national level, the same as other modes of transport, it is expected that increasing emphasis will be placed upon highway transportation in the near future.

IV. Personalities Concerned with such Policies and Activities

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The Minister of Transportation is Boris Pavlovich Beshchev. The names of others at high levels in this Ministry are contained

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does not maintain name files and is unable to provide information on changes in administrative personnel.

V. Annual Changes in Capability

A. Railroads

Changes in the capability of Soviet railroads since World War II have resulted from rehabilitation, new construction, reparations, and acquisition of war booty. Little has been acquired through foreign purchase. The improvement in Soviet railroad facilities is indicated by the following tabulation:

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	<u>1945</u>	<u>1950</u>
Mileage of lines (kms.)	112,868	123,200 *
Mileage of double-track lines (kms.)	21,000	33,500 *
Freight cars (in 2-axle units)	797,000	1,095,000
Locomotives (units)	25,638	31,753
Mileage of electrified line (kms.)	2,038	7,363 *
Mileage of line with automatic block signalling (kms.)	6,950	17,338 *

\* Plan; estimates of fulfillment will be made [redacted] project 43.2.1, "USSR Basic Rail Statistics".

SOURCES: Holland Hunter, "Soviet Railroads since 1940,"  
Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development, Bulletin 4, Sept 1950, Unc.  
Holland Hunter, "Soviet Railroad Policy," MS [redacted]  
Freight car and locomotive inventory estimates from CIA, [redacted]  
ORR 32-51, "Locomotive and Rolling Stock Production in the Soviet Bloc," [redacted]

Changes in capability of the total railroad system may best be expressed in the capability of the freight car park to carry traffic, when compared with turnaround time and average tonnage loaded per car. With an estimated 1,095,000 two-axle freight car units in the inventory in 1950, and a turnaround time of 7.65 days, about 143,000 cars can be loaded per day; with an average loading of 19.1 tons per two-axle unit these 143,000 cars loads could equal about 2,739,000 tons loaded daily, if bad order cars are ignored. Bad order cars would probably amount to little more than five per cent of the total freight car inventory, and capability for car loadings would be reduced to this extent. By comparison, in 1945, with a turnaround time of 10.92 days, average daily carloadings were 61,800 two-axle units, loaded with an average of 17.51 tons per two-axle unit, or

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1,082,000 tons daily. This can be assumed to be the total capability of the total freight car park at that time, which included a relatively high percentage of inoperable cars as a result of war damage.

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The effect on capa-

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bility of increased efficiency is shown in the increased tonnage per car and the reduced turnaround time. Tables giving estimates of the locomotive and freight car inventories by years are included at the end of this section.

The effect of improvements in double tracking, ~~section~~ track, and signals on individual lines cannot be assessed in terms of total capability, because the limiting item in total capability of any national railroad system is the rolling stock rather than the tracks. At the same time, improvements in track and signalling facilitate train operation, and accordingly increase the utilization of existing equipment.

Difficulties encountered in the fulfillment of plan goals pointed toward increasing capability of the Soviet railroads are primarily in obtaining of equipment other than locomotives and rolling stock, and in completion of goals for new construction of lines and of electrification projects for railroads.

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Available data indicate that plans for new construction of lines and for electrification have fallen short of 1950 goals. Whether this was due to shortages of material, or to over-optimistic targets on new construction cannot be determined at present.

**B. Motor Vehicles**

Recent substantial increases in inventory are the result of increased production capacity, planned for 1950, but not completed until mid-1952.

The Fourth Five Year Plan proposed expanding the Gorkiy, Stalin, and Yaroslavl plants, completing those at Liass, Ulyanovsk and Novosibirsk, and building new factories at Kutaisi and Minsk and in the Ukraine, as well as completing four assembly plants.

Between 1947 and 1952 the percentage growth in the output of passenger cars was much faster than in truck production. There are several possible reasons for this, but the foremost one must have been the poor condition of Soviet Highways and the lack of service and repair facilities for trucks outside of the larger cities. Until these conditions are remedied, it is felt that the USSR is producing enough trucks yearly to meet intra-city and short-haul traffic requirements.

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